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Abstract. Secure device pairing is especially difficult for spontaneous
interaction in ubiquitous computing environments because of wireless
communication, lack of powerful user interfaces, and scalability issues.
We demonstrate a method to address this problem for small, mobile
devices that does not require explicit user interfaces like displays or key
pads. By shaking devices together in one hand for a few seconds, they
are securely paired. Device authentication happens implicitly as part of
the pairing process without the need for explicit user interaction “just
for security”. Our method has been implemented in two variants: first,
for high-quality data collection using wired accelerometers; second, using
built-in accelerometers in standard Nokia 5500 mobile phones.
1 Introduction
Device pairing over wireless channels is insecure because of the possibility of
man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks. To safeguard against such threats,
device-to-device communication needs to be authenticated. However, in the case
of spontaneous interaction, only the user who initiates the interaction can dis-
tinguish between the intended target and other similar devices or malicious at-
tackers. Such an authentication is difficult because of two reasons: many devices
lack explicit user interfaces like displays and keypads that could be used to verify
the device pairing, and explicit authentication does not scale when considering
hundreds of spontaneous interactions a day.
Context-based authentication is one approach to address both issues, by using
implicit sensory input and thus making authentication unobtrusive. Shaking
two (or multiple) devices together is one option for device pairing. It has first
been suggested by Holmquist et al. [1] as a possible user interaction method and
subsequently been studied by others [2,3].
When devices are being shaken together, they will experience similar acceler-
ation values. In addition to the user interaction for selecting devices to pair with,
these sensor data streams can be used as input for secure authentication. Our
demonstration applications build upon the authentication method introduced
previously [4]. We present two specific implementations of this method. The
first is used for high-quality data collection, interactive experimentation, and
optimization of parameters and algorithms, and is based on wired accelerom-
eters and laptop or desktop PCs. The second runs on off-the-shelf Nokia 5500
mobile phones and uses their embedded 3D accelerometers.
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22 Authentication based on shaking
Our authentication method as described in detail in [4] consists of five tasks.
The first three pre-processing tasks sensor data acquisition, temporal alignment
and spatial alignment are executed locally and independently on each device and
serve to extract and normalize active segments, which represent the accelerom-
eter time series during shaking. Based on these active segments, the final two
tasks feature extraction and key generation may interactively communicate with
the remote device(s) over insecure wireless channels such as IEEE 802.11 wireless
LAN or IEEE 802.15 Bluetooth to generate authenticated, secret shared keys on
all devices shaken together.
We have proposed two different protocols for implementing the final two
tasks. Both have the same aim of generating an authenticated, secret shared key
from sensor time series, but achieve this with very different designs. The first
protocol uses a conservative design and well-understood cryptographic primitives
in two phases, key agreement and key verification. In the first phase, based on
unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement, the devices agree to secret shared
keys over the wireless channel. Using these keys in the second phase, they run
an extended variant of the interlock protocol to exchange their recorded active
segments in a way that detects man-in-the-middle attacks. Finally, the devices
can locally and independently compare their local with the respective remote
sensor data and verify if the pairing process should succeed or not. Our current
implementation uses the coherence metric, but different devices can use different
means of comparing active segments.
The second protocol is more unconventional and generates the secret shared
key directly from sensor time series. To this end, the feature extraction task
computes exponentially quantized, pairwise added FFT coefficient vectors over
sliding windows of the active segments. These feature vectors are used as input
to a Candidate Key Protocol (CKP) [5], which broadcasts one-way hashes of the
vectors as so-called candidate key parts. If a receiving device can compute the
same one-way hash, it has verified that its sensor input matches that of the sender
without actually revealing it to eavesdroppers. After a sufficient number of such
matching key parts have been collected, they are concatenated and hashed again
to create a so-called candidate key, which is again broadcast. If one or multiple
remote devices can generate the same key, it is acknowledged and can be used
for subsequent secure communication. The second protocol is more dynamic and
scalable, as it allows remote devices to “tune into” the key stream of another.
On the other hand, the first protocol is more flexible in terms of using different
methods of comparison and is considered more secure against offline attacks.
3 Implementation for data collection and experimentation
The sensor data acquisition task of our first implementation uses four ADXL202JE
accelerometers, two per device mounted at an angle of 90◦ and set to output
pulse-width modulation at about 600Hz sample rate with a maximum acceler-
ation of 2 g. The primitive sensor boards are fixed within ping-pong balls using
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3(a) Implementation 1: wired accelerome-
ters for high-quality data collection
(b) Implementation 2: off-the-shelf Nokia
5500 mobile phones
Fig. 1. Two implementations of the “Shake well before use” authentication method
compressed foam so that they will remain constant inside the balls, but with
arbitrary (and from the outside unknown) orientation (see Fig. 1a). All eight
pulse-width modulated output channels are connected directly to a standard
parallel port and polled at around 1MHz, resulting in a resolution of around
10 bits per sample.
A simple ASCII coding of this sensor data stream acts as the interface to a
Java-based implementation, where it is down-sampled to either 128Hz or 256Hz
for the remaining two pre-processing tasks and implementations of both cryp-
tographic authentication protocols. The first protocol uses TCP channels for
communication, while the second one uses UDP multicast packets. Their respec-
tive results are displayed in a simple GUI to give immediate user feedback during
interactive experimentation.
4 Implementation on off-the-shelf mobile phones
Our second implementation runs on off-the-shelf Nokia 5500 mobile phones,
which feature an integrated 3D accelerometer (see Fig. 1b). A background Sym-
bian application is started automatically and uses the Nokia Sensor API to access
the accelerometer data at its pre-set sample rate of around 30Hz [6]. It opens a
TCP socket for streaming a binary coding upon request.
The remaining pre-processing tasks as well as an implementation of the first
protocol using Bluetooth RFCOMM communication are contained within a Java
MIDlet that connects to the TCP socket provided by the Symbian part. Blue-
tooth as a wireless communication channel poses two challenges for the imple-
mentation: there is no broad- or multicast, and inquiry as well as service discovery
are slow for user interaction. Our implementation addresses this by performing
the first phase of the protocol, namely Diffie-Hellman key agreement, oppor-
tunistically. Whenever a compatible device is found by the regular background
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4inquiry process, an unauthenticated secret shared key is established with it. The
second phase is started as soon as a valid active segment segment has been
collected and exchanges it with all remote devices for which a shared key is al-
ready known. Those devices that have been shaken together will then verify that
their respective active segments are similar enough and thereby authenticate the
secret shared key.
5 Conclusions
We present a method for secure device pairing based on shaking devices together.
Two different implementations show different aspects; while the first, wired im-
plementation allows easier experimentation, rapid prototyping of new algorithms
for comparing similarity of active segments, and high-quality data collection, the
second one demonstrates that the method can be used on resource limited de-
vices like mobile phones. Using Bluetooth as a communication channel poses
new challenges, which are partially addressed by implementing opportunistic
key agreement.
Our complete, open source implementations are available at http://www.
openuat.org.
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